Revision [1543]
Most recent edit made on 2007-09-19 04:43:18 by DarTarAdditions:
Deletions:
- Taraborelli, D. (2006)
Perceptual shunts
Proceedings of the 2006 SIFA Annual Meeting, Milano, 28-30 September 2006
html abstract
Revision [1499]
Edited on 2007-08-03 05:41:54 by DarTarAdditions:
Deletions:
Additions:
Deletions:
- Taraborelli, D., Eraña, A. (2007)
Drilling down to modules. On the need of individuation criteria for cognitive modularity.
15th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2007, Geneva, July 9-12, 2007
Additions:
- Taraborelli, D., Eraña, A. (2007)
Drilling down to modules. On the need of individuation criteria for cognitive modularity.
15th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2007, Geneva, July 9-12, 2007
Deletions:
- ~-Taraborelli, D., Eraña, A. (2007)
Drilling down to modules. On the need of individuation criteria for cognitive modularity.
15th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2007, Geneva, July 9-12, 2007
Additions:
- ~-Taraborelli, D., Eraña, A. (2007)
Drilling down to modules. On the need of individuation criteria for cognitive modularity.
15th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2007, Geneva, July 9-12, 2007
Revision [1315]
Edited on 2007-03-02 11:31:32 by DarTarAdditions:
- Taraborelli, D. (2006)
Perceptual shunts
Proceedings of the 2006 SIFA Annual Meeting, Milano, 28-30 September 2006
html abstract
Deletions:
- Taraborelli, D. (2006)
Perceptual shunts
Proceedings of the 2006 SIFA Annual Meeting, Milano, 28-30 September 2006
Additions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central issue in the philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific debate of the last decades. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
- Taraborelli, D. (2006)
Perceptual shunts
Proceedings of the 2006 SIFA Annual Meeting, Milano, 28-30 September 2006
Deletions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central foundational issue in the last decades. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
Revision [1312]
Edited on 2007-03-02 05:34:37 by DarTarAdditions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central foundational issue in the last decades. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
Deletions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties? The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central foundational issue in the last decades.
Additions:
I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
Deletions:
I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
Additions:
I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
Deletions:
I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
Additions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties? The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central foundational issue in the last decades.
Deletions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
Additions:
Part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
My interest in the modularity hypothesis was originally triggered by the question of how to understand results from functional brain imaging suggesting functional specialization of different areas in the human brain.
I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
- Taraborelli, D. (2003)
Verso una nuova frenologia? Considerazioni sull'uso dei metodi di brain imaging e di strategie sottrattive per lo studio della cognizione e delle sue basi neurali. (Towards a new phrenology? Considerations on the use of brain imaging methods and subtractive strategies for the study of cognition and its neural bases)
Logic and Philosophy of Science - L&PS; 1(1) 2003
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (2002)
Feature binding and object perception. Does object awareness require feature conjunction?
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2002, Lyon, July 2002
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (unpublished draft)
Flexible architectures for mandatory modules: A reply to Sperber's Modularity and Relevance
pdf full text
Deletions:
A part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties? My interest in the modularity hypothesis was originally triggered by the question of how to understand results from functional brain imaging suggesting functional specialization of different areas in the human brain. I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
- Taraborelli, D. (2003)
Verso una nuova frenologia? Considerazioni sull'uso dei metodi di brain imaging e di strategie sottrattive per lo studio della cognizione e delle sue basi neurali. (Towards a new phrenology? Considerations on the use of brain imaging methods and subtractive strategies for the study of cognition and its neural bases)
Logic and Philosophy of Science - L&PS; 1(1) 2003
Non-invasive techniques for the visualization of neural activity in the human brain have been used in the past two decades for studying the neural bases of cognition. Their methodology - based on subtractive strategies that are drawn from behavioral studies - relies on a complex set of assumptions that are seldom made explicit in the literature. Taken together, these assumptions sketch a theoretical framework according to which the human brain is seen as mainly constituted of clustered, highly specialized and functionally independent "processing centers". The aim of this paper is to explore the implicit assumptions of these methods and the inferential strategies they use to build hypotheses of correlation between function and structure. Special attention will be devoted to the extent to which these methods have changed the notion of 'module' or 'isolable subsystem' and to the new role of localization hypotheses in the explanation of cognitive architecture.
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (2002)
Feature binding and object perception. Does object awareness require feature conjunction?
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2002, Lyon, July 2002
Recent works in different fields of cognitive sciences seem to support the idea that in order to explain awareness of visually presented objects some kind of binding mechanism is needed for the correct conjunction of different sensory features into a whole percept. Selective attention is commonly invoked as the key for solving this conjunction problem. Accordingly, brain sciences have started to investigate what kind of neural processing could underlie such a process. I analyze the rationale for justifying the existence of a binding problem and I argue against the claim that there is a feature binding problem to be solved in order to explain unity of object awareness. In particular, I question the definition of 'feature' and suggest some possible sources of misunderstanding related to this definition. Finally, I suggest an alternative approach in which perceived object unity does not rely exclusively on attentional conjunction of sensory features: instead of a general and unique mechanism mediating object awareness, I examine evidence that there are at least as many binding mechanisms as potential ways of interacting with visually presented objects.
pdf full text
Additions:
home › research › modularity
A part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties? My interest in the modularity hypothesis was originally triggered by the question of how to understand results from functional brain imaging suggesting functional specialization of different areas in the human brain. I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
Modularity
A part of my reseach focuses on the hypothesis of modularity in cognitive science. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties? My interest in the modularity hypothesis was originally triggered by the question of how to understand results from functional brain imaging suggesting functional specialization of different areas in the human brain. I have also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
- Taraborelli, D. (2003)
Verso una nuova frenologia? Considerazioni sull'uso dei metodi di brain imaging e di strategie sottrattive per lo studio della cognizione e delle sue basi neurali. (Towards a new phrenology? Considerations on the use of brain imaging methods and subtractive strategies for the study of cognition and its neural bases)
Logic and Philosophy of Science - L&PS; 1(1) 2003
Non-invasive techniques for the visualization of neural activity in the human brain have been used in the past two decades for studying the neural bases of cognition. Their methodology - based on subtractive strategies that are drawn from behavioral studies - relies on a complex set of assumptions that are seldom made explicit in the literature. Taken together, these assumptions sketch a theoretical framework according to which the human brain is seen as mainly constituted of clustered, highly specialized and functionally independent "processing centers". The aim of this paper is to explore the implicit assumptions of these methods and the inferential strategies they use to build hypotheses of correlation between function and structure. Special attention will be devoted to the extent to which these methods have changed the notion of 'module' or 'isolable subsystem' and to the new role of localization hypotheses in the explanation of cognitive architecture.
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (2002)
Feature binding and object perception. Does object awareness require feature conjunction?
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2002, Lyon, July 2002
Recent works in different fields of cognitive sciences seem to support the idea that in order to explain awareness of visually presented objects some kind of binding mechanism is needed for the correct conjunction of different sensory features into a whole percept. Selective attention is commonly invoked as the key for solving this conjunction problem. Accordingly, brain sciences have started to investigate what kind of neural processing could underlie such a process. I analyze the rationale for justifying the existence of a binding problem and I argue against the claim that there is a feature binding problem to be solved in order to explain unity of object awareness. In particular, I question the definition of 'feature' and suggest some possible sources of misunderstanding related to this definition. Finally, I suggest an alternative approach in which perceived object unity does not rely exclusively on attentional conjunction of sensory features: instead of a general and unique mechanism mediating object awareness, I examine evidence that there are at least as many binding mechanisms as potential ways of interacting with visually presented objects.
pdf full text
Deletions:
home › research › enactive
[2007] Mossio, M.M., Taraborelli, D.
Framing the Concept of Action-Dependent Perceptual Invariants: From Ecological to Sensorimotor Approaches
(submitted) [2005] Taraborelli, D.
Allocentric vs. egocentric representations. A reply to John Rieser
[Frames of reference in spatial cognition, Paris, November 2005] [2005] Mossio, M.M., Taraborelli, D.
Sensorimotor vs. ecological invariants
[Enactive Workshop on Ecological and Sensorimotor Theories of Perception, Paris, May 2005] [2005] Eraña, A., Sylvand, B., Taraborelli, D.
Tracking Agency (précis)
[Interdisciplines Workshop Referring to Objects, March 3, 2005] [2003] Taraborelli, D., Mossio, M.M.
Spatial Competence: From internal representations to sensorimotor rules
Where is your head at?, 2003 SIFA/AISC Joint meeting, Vietri sul Mare, October 2003]
Enactive
My work as a reserch assistant at Institut Nicod (2005-2006) was supported by the European Network of Excellence ENACTIVE (IST-2002-002114). The goal of the network is to investigate theoretical, empirical and applied issues in the relation between action and perception. The focus of my work in the network has been on comparing background assumptions and conceptual notions adopted in ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception.Framing the Concept of Action-Dependent Perceptual Invariants: From Ecological to Sensorimotor Approaches
(submitted)
Allocentric vs. egocentric representations. A reply to John Rieser
[Frames of reference in spatial cognition, Paris, November 2005]
Sensorimotor vs. ecological invariants
[Enactive Workshop on Ecological and Sensorimotor Theories of Perception, Paris, May 2005]
Tracking Agency (précis)
[Interdisciplines Workshop Referring to Objects, March 3, 2005]
Spatial Competence: From internal representations to sensorimotor rules
Where is your head at?, 2003 SIFA/AISC Joint meeting, Vietri sul Mare, October 2003]
Revision [1295]
The oldest known version of this page was edited on 2007-03-02 03:51:56 by DarTar [Cloned from enactive]Enactive
My work as a reserch assistant at Institut Nicod (2005-2006) was supported by the European Network of Excellence ENACTIVE (IST-2002-002114). The goal of the network is to investigate theoretical, empirical and applied issues in the relation between action and perception. The focus of my work in the network has been on comparing background assumptions and conceptual notions adopted in ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception.
References
- [2007] Mossio, M.M., Taraborelli, D.
Framing the Concept of Action-Dependent Perceptual Invariants: From Ecological to Sensorimotor Approaches
(submitted) - [2005] Taraborelli, D.
Allocentric vs. egocentric representations. A reply to John Rieser
[Frames of reference in spatial cognition, Paris, November 2005] - [2005] Mossio, M.M., Taraborelli, D.
Sensorimotor vs. ecological invariants
[Enactive Workshop on Ecological and Sensorimotor Theories of Perception, Paris, May 2005] - [2005] Eraña, A., Sylvand, B., Taraborelli, D.
Tracking Agency (précis)
[Interdisciplines Workshop Referring to Objects, March 3, 2005] - [2003] Taraborelli, D., Mossio, M.M.
Spatial Competence: From internal representations to sensorimotor rules
Where is your head at?, 2003 SIFA/AISC Joint meeting, Vietri sul Mare, October 2003]
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