Modularity
Part of my research focuses on the modularity hypothesis in cognitive science. The question of how to identify isolable cognitive domains and the processes underlying these domains has been a central issue in the philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific debate of the last decades. What is a module? What are its core features? Are there empirical criteria to isolate cognitive systems characterized by modular properties?
My interest in the modularity hypothesis was originally triggered by the question of how to understand results from functional brain imaging suggesting functional specialization of different areas in the human brain.
I also studied the role modularity criteria play in the rationale for a binding problem in human perception.
References
- Taraborelli, D., Eraņa, A. (2007)
Drilling down to modules. On the need of individuation criteria for cognitive modularity.
15th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2007, Geneva, July 9-12, 2007
html abstract - Taraborelli, D. (2006)
Perceptual shunts
SIFA 2006, Milano, 28-30 September 2006
html abstract - Taraborelli, D. (2003)
Verso una nuova frenologia? Considerazioni sull'uso dei metodi di brain imaging e di strategie sottrattive per lo studio della cognizione e delle sue basi neurali. (Towards a new phrenology? Considerations on the use of brain imaging methods and subtractive strategies for the study of cognition and its neural bases)
Logic and Philosophy of Science - L&PS; 1(1) 2003
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (2002)
Feature binding and object perception. Does object awareness require feature conjunction?
10th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology - ESPP 2002, Lyon, July 2002
pdf full text - Taraborelli, D. (unpublished draft)
Flexible architectures for mandatory modules: A reply to Sperber's Modularity and Relevance
pdf full text